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Book Review: Andreas Kalyvas. Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary: Max 
Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Hannah Arendt. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008. 326 pp. 
 
John Wolfe Ackerman 
 
Andreas KalyvasÕs Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary entails a wide-ranging 
effort to generate Òa new theory of democracy with a radical intentÓ by arraying Hannah 
Arendt with Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in the framework of extraordinary foundings of 
political orders, or instances of what Kalyvas calls, following Cornelius Castoriadis, the 
Òlucid and deliberate self-institution of societyÓ (292-93).1 Kalyvas focuses on a certain 
aspect of each of their respective bodies of workÑÒWeberÕs theory of charisma, SchmittÕs 
conception of the constituent power, and ArendtÕs notion of new beginningsÓ (10)Ñusing 
these Òthree distinct variations on a single themeÓ as historical building blocks in the 
construction of his own contemporary theory of collective, political foundings, toward which 
ArendtÕs work in particular would provide the key, final component. The readings of Weber 
and Schmitt Kalyvas produces along the way have distinct merits: he takes seriously the 
political character of WeberÕs sociology of religion, from which he excavates an account of  
ÒcharismaÓ that is not bound up with personal traits of individual leaders, refusing to relegate 
this popular political phenomenon to an archaic, premodern past. Kalyvas compellingly 
counters readings of Schmitt that see in his critiques of Weimar German democracy attacks 
on all democracy, and he attends to SchmittÕs own positive account of democracy, especially 
as it is laid out in his major, late-Weimar Verfassungslehre. From reading Schmitt with 
Weber, Kalyvas concludes that Òa comprehensive theory of the extraordinary, unlike WeberÕs 
but like SchmittÕs, must take into account not only the first moment of the original founding 
                                                
1 Page numbers in the text refer to KalyvasÕs volume under review. 
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but also the second one, that of the stabilization and conservation of the constituent compactÓ 
(255), and it must (contra WeberÕs own ultimate rejection of popular, charismatic, political 
foundings) with Schmitt recover the founding creativity of the popular Òconstituent powerÓ 
(in SchmittÕs rendering, verfassunggebende Gewalt) for politics. Arendt, finally, unlike 
Weber, Òthought that radical changes [are not] incompatible with legality, and contrary to 
Schmitt, she rejected the idea of total breaks and absolute foundingsÓ (192). Counter to 
popular representations of Arendt as all too ruptural, which reflect insufficient attention to 
her On Revolution and its theory of constitutionalism, ArendtÕs work, when read against 
Weber and Schmitt, would offer a corrective to their shortcomings while also being 
supplemented by their strengths, thereby producing a suitably consideredÑÒtamedÓÑversion 
of extraordinary beginnings. 
Kalyvas has written a piece of political theory, not intellectual history: his aim is to 
selectively mine the resources offered by a series of thinkers who just happen to share a 
common historical context in order to theorize a novel alternative to a false, present-day 
choice between legalistic liberal theories of constitutionalism and ÒpostmodernÓ rejections of 
law and stability. Kalyvas extracts the three authorsÕ works from their historical context to 
build his own theory, and when they do not readily supply what he is looking for, he 
supplements them with the arguments of thinkers from Castoriadis to Habermas. For those 
unfamiliar with ongoing debates in political science, the book might make frustrating reading 
at times. Above all, the instrumentalist character of KalyvasÕs construction makes for an odd 
underestimation of the commonalities between Weber, Schmitt, and Arendt: Ò. . . certain 
interesting similarities among them cannot be totally overlooked. For example, they were all 
Germans marked by the decisive experience of the Weimar RepublicÓ (9). But given 
KalyvasÕs critical project, it seems fair to ask whether his general neglect of the Weimar 
context, which acted as a crucible for the thought-constellation formed by the three of them, 
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does not perhaps pose problems for his theoretical construction that go beyond historical 
details. 
ÒWhere and when men succeed in keeping intact the power which sprang up between 
them during the course of any particular act or deed, they are already in the process of 
foundation [. . .],Ó Arendt wrote four decades later in On Revolution, in the midst of her 
unorthodox account of the constitution of political freedom and perpetuation of Ònew 
beginningÓ prospectively enacted by the American ÒfoundersÓ at the time of the Revolution.2 
This book serves as the key text in KalyvasÕs new reading of Arendt, but he only remarks this 
particular formulation in passing. It might, however, have merited a more central 
consideration: it is one of the many places where ArendtÕs temporality of political founding 
disturbs his organization of Òthe extraordinaryÓ and Ònormal politicsÓ according to temporal 
Òmoments.Ó This is a challenge for KalyvasÕs study, for ArendtÕs distinctive temporality 
operates in the interest of what leads him to present her work as a corrective to SchmittÕs, 
capable of actualizing the democratic potential in SchmittÕs thoughtÑnamely, that ÒArendt 
held onto the possibility of reconciling extraordinary politics with a lasting constitutional 
governmentÓ (192). But whereas Arendt seeks to elucidate an ongoingÑand thus durableÑ
political foundation, one that cannot be separated, especially not temporally, from the 
everyday Òany particular act or deedÓ out of which what she calls ÒpowerÓ springs and 
through which this power is kept alive, KalyvasÕs insistent temporal separation of 
extraordinary from normal politics replays the splitÑÒthe very fact that . . . the concern with 
stability and the spirit of the new, have become opposites in political thought and 
terminologyÓÑthat Arendt sought to remedy in On Revolution.3 ArendtÕs ÒalreadyÓÑwhich 
marks the surprisingly ÒordinaryÓ character of Òthe extraordinaryÓÑfundamentally troubles 
                                                
2 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, 1965 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), 175. 
3 Ibid., 223. 
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KalyvasÕs presentation of the insights to be gleaned from reading Arendt with Schmitt and 
Weber. 
KalyvasÕs interest in doing so lies in the potential to thereby find Òa proper balance 
between the first and second momentÓ of democratic politics, the extraordinary moment of 
establishing the constitution and the subsequent normal politics which proceeds within its 
parameters (8, 14). In KalyvasÕs understanding, Ònormal politicsÓ is ÒutilitarianÓ and Òstatist,Ó 
Òcharacterized by civic privatism, depoliticization, and passivity and carried out by political 
elites, professional bureaucrats, and social techniciansÓ (6). For there to be novelty, change, 
and continuing popular control over any constitution, normal politics must therefore be semi-
regularly interrupted by the extraordinary. Kalyvas proposes that the balance between the 
first and second moments of democracy can be achieved via a Òthird momentÓ that would 
Òallow for the emulation of the founding experience alongside the restrictions imposed byÓ 
the constitutional order (193). Although he finds hints of this in Schmitt, it is Arendt, namely, 
who preserved WeberÕs and SchmittÕs invocations of constituent power while correcting their 
Òoveremphasis on the legitimate origins of political dominationÓ through her focus on 
political freedom (192). Moreover, attuned to Òthe subterranean threat of an abysmal, 
groundless freedom,Ó ArendtÕs Òfiguration of normal power takes a legal, procedural formÓ 
(257-58). Kalyvas, thus, offers a depiction of ArendtÕs Òmature version of freedomÓ as 
ÒdualÓ: the extraordinary, revolutionary freedom of Òthe constituent power as the power to 
constitute,Ó which involves Òthe genuine generation of power,Ó lays down Òthe boundaries 
that delineate the proper frontiers of the politicalÓ within which the Ònormal freedom of 
disclosureÓ occurs during nonrevolutionary times (202-04). But since Arendt perceived that 
this solution to the Òvicious circleÓ of foundings threatened to tilt the balance too far in the 
direction of normal politics, she explored modes for keeping the constituent power alive, 
first, through popular councils and, then, in civil disobedience. In the latter, in particular, 
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Kalyvas finds a convincing vision of a third political moment that could mediate between 
extraordinary and normal politics, providing the key, Òsemi-extraordinaryÓ element in his 
Ònew theory of democracy as three-dimensionalÓ (295-300). 
 Thanks to this depiction of Arendt, Kalyvas is able to read her as supplementing and 
correcting, in a democratic direction, the politics of the extraordinary prepared, in his telling, 
by Weber and Schmitt. But does this depiction of Arendt, and the rapprochement among her 
and Schmitt and Weber that it enables, capture the spirit of the account of new beginnings 
that Arendt puts forth in On Revolution and elsewhere? Is it attentive to her critique of rule 
(Herrschaft, i.e., the same word as Weberian ÒdominationÓ) or, for that matter, to her specific 
hesitations about the term democracy, which is terminologically and genealogically bound up 
with rule and thus shadowed by the threat rule poses to politics? Is this a plausible account of 
ArendtÕs relationship to Schmitt and Weber, who after all were hardly unknown to her as key 
figures in the Weimar intellectual environment in which she attended university and 
produced her first publications? 
Kalyvas, despite grouping them together, is poorly positioned to grasp the extent of 
ArendtÕs critical engagement with Weimar thought. He is not alone; although there have been 
numerous attempts to draw connections between Arendt and Schmitt, none have seriously 
considered the possibility of such links stemming from the years of the Weimar Republic. 
ArendtÕs major Weimar-era publication, her 1929 doctoral dissertation, Der Liebesbegriff bei 
Augustin, does not appear in KalyvasÕs bibliography.4 Yet, at several key points in this study 
of Òthe relevance of the neighborÓ to AugustineÕs conception of love, Arendt asserts, in 
unmistakable reference to Schmitt, that experiencing the neighbor in Òconcrete, worldly 
encountersÓ means encountering the neighbor Òas friend or enemyÓÑwhile arguing 
simultaneously, contra Schmitt, that the recourse to a unitary, sovereign order with the power 
                                                
4 Hannah Arendt, Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin: Versuch einer philosophischen 
Interpretation (Berlin: Springer, 1929). 
 Ackerman 6 
of decisionÑan order which, in AugustineÕs depiction, Òdecides on loveÓ (ber die Liebe 
entscheidet)Ñblocks the very encounter with the neighbor in which any judgment about him 
or her or it, that is, Òetwa als Freund oder Feind,Ó could be made.5 Although there is space 
here only to signal it, attention to ArendtÕs extended engagement with Schmitt, of which her 
dissertation was only the beginning, makes it difficult to see her work as loosely compatible 
with SchmittÕs in the way that KalyvasÕs account suggests. It also illuminates the 
distinctiveness of her project in On Revolution by bringing forth a different understanding of 
her Òpolitics of the extraordinaryÓ: a more ordinary one, located always in the midst of 
everyday life, in which the always new, plural encounters necessary for politics, and the new 
beginnings they provoke, are possible to the extent that no unitary, sovereign order, even a 
popularly constituted one, has precluded them. 
 This alternate Arendtian account of a politics of the (extra)ordinaryÑof a, or various, 
politics that are shot through with infinite instances of the entirely new everydayÑthus has 
little in common with KalyvasÕs normal politics. These Arendtian politics emerge out of 
political acts and experiences that depend on constitution and constitutions to endure but are 
never preconstituted by them. Kalyvas appeals to a decisively different ÒdemocraticÓ 
extraordinary, one that is located in the distinct moments of the sovereign constituent powerÕs 
self-instituting activity. But because the extraordinary, in ArendtÕs imagination, does not take 
this Schmittian form, it also does not need to be tamed by Òa new principle of legality that 
put[s] an end to extraordinary politics,Ó as Kalyvas would have it (258). Kalyvas notes only 
the Òextraordinary,Ó ruptural character of action and beginnings in ArendtÕs accountÑbut 
(like others before him) is distinctly insensitive to ArendtÕs insistence on the regularity of 
ÒmiraclesÓ; Òevery act,Ó she declares in Between Past and Future, Òis a ÔmiracleÕÑthat is, 
something which could not be expected,Ó and in history it is because Òthe miracle of accident 
                                                
5 Ibid., 28, 69, 79. 
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and infinite improbability occurs so frequently that it seems strange to speak of miracles at 
all.Ó6 The promising novelty in ArendtÕs account is her insistence that to separate ordinary 
and extraordinary, to see them as opposed, is to misunderstand both, and also revolution and 
everyday politics, beginning, freedom, and political action. This misunderstanding, 
insinuating itself into contemporary democratic theory, is likely to inaugurate the slide into 
the mistaken conception of politics in terms of Herrschaft, in which stable institutions would 
be secured only at the price of new beginnings, and of politics and political freedom, 
themselves. 
 Kalyvas is not unaware of this problem. He acknowledges that Òthe theory of dualist 
democracy . . . is confronted with a critical obstacle: the dichotomization and 
compartmentalization of politics into two distinct, unrelated temporal momentsÓ (172). It thus 
Òcuts off the possible links between normal and extraordinary politics [and] occludes the 
various forms in which the sovereign constituent power can survive within constituted 
politicsÓ (174). This is the problem that his three-level model is supposed to solve: for 
Kalyvas, ArendtÕs observation that the perceived opposition between the two elements of 
revolution, Òthe concern with stability and the spirit of the new, [. . .] must be recognized to 
be among the symptoms of our lossÓ of the revolutionary spirit, would simply restate the 
paradoxical character of revolution that demands a difficult reconciliation of its two 
moments.7 This is a paradox of KalyvasÕs own making, however (and of other advocates of a 
deliberative constitutionalism), which then requires his ÒsolutionÓ: his Ònormal politicsÓ has 
become so thoroughly normalized that it requires a separate and distinct extraordinary to 
interrupt itÑwhich is, as such, potentially too interruptive and must be reined in by norms. 
As a result, the specter of normalization looms again, and so a third moment is summoned: 
                                                
6 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought, 1968, 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), 169Ð70. 
7 Arendt, On Revolution, 223; Kalyvas 262. 
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the kind of less ruly, everyday political practices that his overly normalized normal politics 
had expunged now return in the guise of the saving Òsemi-extraordinary.Ó Arendt, in contrast, 
eludes this paradoxÑthrough an account of the interrelationship of ordinary and 
extraordinary in which these, and other related binaries, are not opposites. Hers is an account 
not of the politics of the extraordinary (in its opposition to the ordinary), but of multiple, 
ongoing times of extraordinary beginning(s) occurring in the midst of ordinary life. ArendtÕs 
political thought emerged out of her critical engagement with Weimar debates at the 
intersection of philosophy, theology, and politics, out of which Schmitt would remain one of 
her key interlocutors. KalyvasÕs effort to place Arendt, through a partial realignment with 
Schmitt, in the service of a politics of extraordinary popular (quasi-)sovereign foundings 
indeed makes evident the need to attend newly to ArendtÕs encounter with SchmittÑa task 
that despite the publication of this venturesome study remains outstanding. 
 
